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 
Abstract— Payload Attribution Systems (PAS) are one of the 
most important tools of network forensics for detecting an 
offender after the occurrence of a cybercrime. A PAS stores the 
network traffic history in order to detect the source and 
destination pair of a certain data stream in case a malicious 
activity occurs on the network. The huge volume of information 
that is daily transferred in the network means that the data 
stored by a PAS must be as compact and concise as possible. 
Moreover, the investigation of this large volume of data for a 
malicious data stream must be handled within a reasonable time. 
For this purpose, several techniques based on storing a digest of 
traffic using Bloom filters have been proposed in the literature. 
The false positive rate of existing techniques for detecting 
cybercriminals is unacceptably high, i.e., many source and 
destination pairs are falsely determined as malicious, making it 
difficult to detect the true criminal. In order to ameliorate this 
problem, we have proposed a solution based on compressed 
bitmap index tables and traffic downsampling. Our analytical 
evaluation and experimental results show that the proposed 
method significantly reduces the false positive rate.  
Index Terms— Network forensics, Cybercriminal detection, 
Payload attribution, Bloom filter, Traffic downsampling. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
etwork forensics is a subset of digital forensics, which 
deals with crimes in computer networks. It contains a set 
of traffic recording and analysis techniques used to acquire 
legal evidence for the purpose of proving or rejecting an 
accusation. While network security and its tools protect a 
network from attacks and intrusions, network forensics gathers 
evidence of cybercrimes. The appearance of new 
vulnerabilities, possible insider treachery, and the rapid 
development of network technology means that security tools 
cannot provide absolute security against threats. Hence, 
network forensic tools complement intrusion detection and 
prevention systems to support post-mortem investigations [1], 
[2]. 
One important technique of network forensics is “payload 
attribution.” In this context, “attribution” is the problem of 
determining the source and destination of traffic instances [3]. 
An instance of traffic, which is simply called an “excerpt,” can 
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be a single, multiple, a fraction, or any other combination of 
packet payloads. A payload attribution system (PAS) captures 
and records network traffic for an extended duration, i.e., for 
as long as possible. At the investigation time, a specific 
excerpt is given to the PAS, and the system determines the 
source and destination of all packets that carried the excerpt. 
This system can be used as the core of a network forensic 
system to investigate cybercrimes committed through 
computer networks. For example, it could be used in an 
organization to trace the spread of worms in order to detect 
infected systems and the source of attack by looking for the 
signature of the worm in the traffic history. As another 
example, the system can be used to discover the insider who 
has disclosed sensitive information of the organization. 
The simplest way to develop a PAS is to record and archive 
raw network traffic. Many traffic recording tools have been 
proposed so far. See for instance [4], [5]. They can capture 
and archive full network traffic for high-bandwidth links. 
These tools, which are somehow similar to surveillance 
cameras, record all packets transferred via the network link for 
a predefined duration and retrieve and provide them for 
security experts and investigators when needed. However, the 
application of this technique is very limited because of the 
large volume of required storage. Even if this large storage can 
be supplied, the determination of source and destination of the 
excerpt within this huge volume of data would be a 
challenging problem. Another important problem of traffic 
recording is the violation of privacy. By using the raw network 
traffic that is recorded in this approach, it is possible to access 
personal information of users. The privacy problem makes a 
traffic recorder inappropriate for most situations. The 
paradoxical requirements of privacy protection and network 
forensics are so challenging that a new set of architectures and 
protocols have been proposed for the Internet [6], [7]. 
However, they are far from being accepted in the real world. 
Kulesh et al. [3], [8] have presented a new PAS which tries 
to resolve the problems associated with traffic recording 
systems. The main approach is to store a digest for each 
packet instead of the whole packet. Traffic packets are 
digested by a data structure called “Bloom filter.” The Bloom 
filter is stored in a permanent storage system in order to be 
used at the investigation time. Consequently, the stored traffic 
data is considerably reduced; for example, in a typical 
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situation, a 4 GB piece of traffic can be digested by a 40 MB 
Bloom filter (i.e., a data reduction ratio of 100:1). The 
digesting process of the PAS has a low-time complexity due to 
the use of the Bloom filter, and consequently, it can digest 
high-bandwidth traffic in a real-time manner. The 
impossibility of recovering the traffic from the digest is 
another feature of this solution which guarantees privacy. Fig. 
1 represents the general layout of the PAS and its common 
deployment location. 
The investigation of a malicious excerpt in the PAS is 
composed of two steps as shown in Fig. 2. In the first step, 
which is called “appearance check” step, the system 
determines whether or not the excerpt has appeared in a 
specific time interval of the traffic. In the second step, called 
“flow determination” step, the system determines all the flows 
(source and destination pairs) that carried the excerpt if the 
answer to the first step is positive. However, both steps suffer 
from “false positive” issue. A false positive event occurs 
during the appearance check step if an excerpt does not belong 
to the traffic however, it is falsely determined as so. A false 
positive in the flow determination step is a flow that has 
falsely been reported as the carrier of the excerpt. The false 
positive rate of the system can be traded off against its data 
reduction ratio, i.e., a higher data reduction ratio results in a 
higher false positive rate. 
Kulesh reported a relatively low false positive rate for a 
data reduction ration of 39:1 [3]. Additional studies have 
sought to improve the false positive rate and the data reduction 
ratio [9]–[14]. In these works, only the appearance check step 
has been evaluated, and no report exists on the false positives 
of the flow determination step. This is a common shortcoming 
of previous studies while the goal of a PAS is to detect the 
source and destination of cybercrimes. Evaluations in the 
previous works did not reveal high false positive rates of the 
proposed methods. Only under certain conditions, the false 
positive rate of the appearance check step can be generalized 
to the flow determination step. Further details on this 
shortcoming are presented in Section II. 
According to recent surveys, the storage and privacy 
problems are still open challenges in network forensics [15], 
[16]. Our analysis and experiments, presented in this paper, 
show that the previous payload attribution systems result in a 
high false positive rate for the flow determination step; hence, 
many flows are falsely reported as the excerpt carriers. This 
problem indicates it is practically infeasible to detect the 
actual source and destination of the excerpt, because the many 
false flows that are reported as source and destination pairs 
make the investigation of the malicious activity confusing. 
Therefore, these systems have not yet been employed in 
practice. Our main goal in this paper is to significantly reduce 
falsely determined flows, and improve the feasibility of 
payload attribution systems for cybercriminal detection. We 
believe that if the false positive rate is reduced, the system can 
also be used in other related fields such as cloud forensics and 
P2P networks which deal with a huge volume of data [17], 
[18]. 
In this paper, first, we propose a downsampling technique 
which removes parts of traffic less informative for a PAS. This 
novel technique decreases the insertion rate of Bloom filter 
and consequently the false positive rate of the PAS. Second, 
we focus on the flow determination step which has not been 
deeply studied by the previous works. We present a simple, 
though effective feature extraction approach, based on the 
combination of a Bloom filter with a compressed bitmap index 
table in order to prevent the PAS from exhaustively querying 
in the flow determination step. As a result of the flow query 
rate reduction, the false positive rate of the flow determination 
step will significantly decrease. The idea behind the solution is 
based on previous research on characteristics of flows in 
network traffic. We call our PAS “CBID” which is the 
abbreviation of “Compressed Bitmap Index and traffic 
Downsampling.” We prove the effectiveness of our solution 
with an information theoretic approach. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II 
briefly discusses related works. The proposed PAS is 
presented in Section III, and Section IV evaluates it. Section V 
presents some discussions about the proposed method. We 
conclude the paper in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
All the previous payload attribution systems based on traffic 
digesting have used Bloom filter as their main building block. 
In the following, we review the Bloom filter and briefly 
discuss the evolution of payload attribution systems. 
A. Bloom Filter 
A Bloom filter [19] is a space-efficient probabilistic data   Fig. 2.  The investigation procedure of a PAS. 
  
 
Fig. 1.  The general layout of a PAS (Payload Attribution System) 
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structure that represents a set in order to support membership 
queries. It consists of an m-bit array and a set of k independent 
hash functions ℎ଴, … , ℎ௞ିଵ ranging from {0, … , 𝑚 − 1}. All 
the array entries are initially set to 0. The n-member set 𝑆 =
{𝑠଴, … , 𝑠௡ିଵ} is stored in the Bloom filter by setting bits at 
position ℎ௜(𝑠௝) to 1 for all 0 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 − 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛 − 1. 
A membership query for element x is done by determining 
whether or not bits at position ℎ௜(𝑥) are set to 1 for all 0 ≤
𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 − 1. If at least one bit is 0, element x is definitely not a 
member of the set; otherwise, it is considered to be a member 
of the set. The space efficiency of a Bloom filter is achieved at 
the cost of the controllable probability of false positive 
answers as estimated by Equation 1; however, Bloom filters 
obviously do not have false negatives. A comprehensive 
survey of Bloom filters and their network applications can be 
found in [20], [21]. 
𝐹𝑃 = (1 − (1 − ଵ
௠
)௞௡)௞ ≈ (1 − 𝑒ି
ೖ೙
೘ )௞ (1) 
B. Payload Attribution Systems 
As stated, the simplest way to have a PAS is to store the 
whole payload of all packets. Kulesh et al. [3] proposed a PAS 
based on storage of digests of packets in order to decrease the 
storage volume needed to save the history of traffic. The 
system, called Hierarchical Bloom Filter (HBF), is capable of 
answering queries for an excerpt with a low-time complexity 
and can also preserve privacy. Briefly, HBF works as follows: 
In the digest generation phase, the payload of each packet is 
partitioned into equal-sized blocks, and each block is inserted 
into a Bloom filter. For example, if a payload is 
ABCDEFJHIJKLMNO and the partitioning size is 3 bytes, the 
blocks which are sampled and inserted into the Bloom filter 
are as represented in Fig. 3 (a). When the false positive 
probability of the Bloom filter reaches a predefined value, it is 
moved to a permanent storage system, and next packets are 
inserted into another Bloom filter. Consequently, each stored 
Bloom filter is the traffic digest of a specific time interval. 
During an investigation, a query for the appearance check 
of an excerpt is processed as follows: First, the excerpt is 
partitioned. Since the excerpt may not start exactly on a block 
boundary, partitioning is done with all possible alignments. In 
the above example, if excerpt FGHIJKLM is queried, it is 
partitioned according to the three cases shown in Fig. 3 (b). 
For each case of partitioning, the stored Bloom filters are 
queried for all the complete blocks (3-byte blocks in this 
example). The excerpt will be considered as belonging to the 
traffic if queries for all blocks of a partitioning get positive 
answers. In the example, the query will definitively receive a 
positive answer for the second case for which blocks GHI and 
JKL are queried. However, the two other cases could also get 
false positive answers because of the false positive possibility 
of Bloom filter. HBF uses offsets associated with the blocks in 
order to verify that the blocks have appeared consecutively in 
a single payload. Further details can be found in [3]. 
Up to this point, HBF has only been able to check whether 
or not a specific excerpt has appeared in the traffic; however, 
it cannot determine the corresponding source and destination. 
To address this problem, in addition to the mentioned blocks, 
HBF stores another type of blocks which are a combination of 
packet pieces and the flow identifier of the packet. HBF also 
stores a list of all flows seen during traffic processing. Fig. 4 
depicts this process and the two types of blocks, which we call 
“type-I” and “type-II” blocks. Consequently, there will be a 
Bloom filter and a flow list for each specific time interval in 
the storage system. Hence, the investigation of an excerpt 
proceeds in the following manner: The appearance check step 
determines the Bloom filters containing the queried excerpt. 
Then, in the flow determination process, each determined 
Bloom filter is queried for type-II blocks using all the flows 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Fig. 3.  An example of payload partitioning and excerpt querying (with a partitioning size of 3 bytes).  
Fig. 4.  The process of traffic digest generation. 𝐵଴, 𝐵ଵ, 𝐵ଶ, … are pieces of the 
payload after partitioning. The type-I and type-II blocks are used for 
appearance check and flow determination, respectively. 
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saved in its corresponding flow list. Each flow for which all 
the blocks of the excerpt receive a positive answer is 
considered to be a carrier of the excerpt. 
Cho et al. [10] proposed a similar approach called rolling 
Bloom filter (RBF) to resolve the problem of block alignment. 
The evaluation results of RBF are similar to the best case of 
HBF as noted in [9] and [12]. Ponec et al. [9], [11] studied the 
weaknesses of HBF and offered WBS and WMH methods to 
decrease the false positives. WBS stands for Winnowing 
Block Shingling. The shingling approach replaces the offsets 
in the HBF. It uses block overlapping in order to verify the 
consecutiveness of blocks in a single payload. To remove the 
need for testing all possible alignments for the first block, 
WBS does not use fixed-size blocks, but instead sets block 
boundaries based on computations on payload contents which 
results in variable-sized blocks. The boundary selection 
scheme is based on the winnowing fingerprinting algorithm 
[22]. WMH uses several instances of WBS with different 
parameters to decrease the false positives. These two methods 
have been evaluated by querying for the appearance check of 
excerpts which had not appeared in the experimented traffic. 
Based on YES/NO answers to these queries, a false positive 
rate has been reported for each method. Although they 
reported low false positive rates, our experiments showed 
unacceptably higher false positive rates. Since they did not 
evaluate the methods in the flow determination step, they 
presumably had not inserted the type-II blocks into Bloom 
filters, which could increase the false positive rate of Bloom 
filters. The false positive rate of the appearance check step can 
be generalized to the flow determination step only if the type-
II blocks are also inserted into Bloom filters. However, this is 
not clear in the paper. Our evaluations in Section IV clarify 
this issue. 
Haghighat et al. [12] presented the CMBF method, which 
supports wildcard queries. This kind of query is useful when 
only parts of the excerpt are known, such as the signature of a 
polymorphic worm. In this case, the unknown parts are filled 
with wildcard bytes. Previous methods must carry out an 
exhaustive search for these queries which can take a long time 
and may generate many false positives because of the large 
number of queries. CMBF has been evaluated similarly, i.e., 
for the appearance check step and without considering the 
type-II blocks. Its false positive rate is slightly lower than 
WBS and WMH for regular queries (without wildcards). 
The last proposed method is WDWQ [13] which is based on 
a combination of WBS and CMBF. It has yielded a lower false 
positive rate in the same evaluation procedure. However, as 
our more elaborated experiments show in Section IV, the 
actual false positive rate of the previous methods is very high. 
In the next section, we present our new method, CBID, which 
significantly decreases the false positive rate. 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
There are two important reasons for the high false positive 
rate of a PAS. The first is the high insertion rate of payload 
blocks which increases the false positive rate of Bloom filters. 
In order to alleviate this problem, we present a downsampling 
approach on payload data to decrease the number of blocks 
inserted into Bloom filters. The second reason is the large 
number of queries to Bloom filters in the flow determination 
step. As stated before, after the appearance check step and 
determination of the Bloom filters containing the queried 
excerpt, the PAS exhaustively queries for all traffic flows 
corresponding to the determined Bloom filters. Consequently, 
the false positive rate of the flow determination step increases 
with the number of queries to Bloom filters. This important 
problem has not been addressed by the previous works. We 
resolve it by a simple feature extraction approach based on 
Bitmap index tables. 
A. Downsampling 
We use winnowing to select block boundaries, and 
shingling to resolve the consecutiveness problem as discussed 
in [9]. This scheme samples blocks in a variable-size manner 
and results in a uniform distribution of blocks as a function of 
block size. We examined this property by applying the 
boundary selection scheme on 100 GB of our CE Department 
network traffic1, and storing its digest in a Bloom filter with a 
data reduction ratio of 100:1. The winnowing window and the 
shingling overlap length of our experiment are 64 and 4 bytes, 
respectively. Therefore, block sizes must be between 6 and 69 
bytes. Fig. 5 shows the distribution of blocks as a function of 
block size in the experiment.  
As can be seen in Fig. 5, the distribution is uniform. The 
initial peak for the smallest block size is due to low-entropy 
payloads, such as a long string of zeroes. A similar result has 
been observed in [9]. The fact that the number of small blocks 
is approximately equal to the number of larger blocks is the 
downside of the winnowing technique as a variable-size 
sampling scheme. Small blocks increase the block insertion 
rate and consequently, augment the false positive rate of 
Bloom filters. Fixed-block size schemes, such as HBF and 
CMBF, have a lower block insertion rate. However, unlike a 
 
1 We recorded only TCP and UDP packets. The traffic comprises 81% TCP 
and 19% UDP. The traffic distribution was uniform at recording time. The 
distribution of traffic flows as a function of flow size is shown in Fig. 8. 
Fig. 5.  Distribution of blocks as a function of block size. 
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fixed-block size scheme, the winnowing technique does not 
suffer from the alignment problem. 
We exploit the uniform distribution of blocks in our 
downsampling approach. Obviously, small blocks contain less 
information than large blocks. Moreover, the sample space of 
small blocks is evidently smaller than large ones. Hence, in 
comparison to large blocks, a considerable portion of the 
sample space of small blocks is inserted into Bloom filters. 
This decreases the true negative probability for small blocks 
and consequently, makes them less effective in the reduction 
of false positives. In order to experimentally evaluate it, we 
queried the Bloom filter for 10000 excerpts, none of which 
had appeared in the trace. The size of excerpts was 200 bytes. 
Fig. 6 shows the distribution of true negative answers to 
queries for blocks of the excerpts. The distribution is shown as 
a function of block size. Although the distribution of blocks as 
a function of block size is uniform (Fig. 5), larger blocks are 
more effective as indicated by Fig. 6. Hence, we propose to 
downsample payload blocks in the digesting procedure by 
discarding blocks smaller than a predefined size and inserting 
only large blocks into Bloom filters. In the investigation time, 
the answer to a query for such blocks is assumed to be 
positive. The uniform distribution of blocks guarantees that 
the participation probability of all sizes in an excerpt are 
approximately equal and therefore there are enough blocks of 
large sizes in the excerpt. This scheme not only resolves the 
alignment problem but also ameliorates the block insertion 
rate. In other words, we have the advantages of both fixed-size 
and variable-size schemes. The predefined size below which 
the blocks are discarded is called “downsampling threshold” 
in this paper. It should also be noted that this scheme does not 
suffer from false negatives because the answers to queries for 
blocks smaller than the threshold are assumed to be positive. 
From a theoretical standpoint, by using the downsampling 
technique, the PAS performance is affected by a tradeoff 
between the false positive probability of the Bloom filter and 
the number of queried blocks for an excerpt. A larger 
downsampling threshold reduces the false positive probability 
of the Bloom filter. On the other hand, a high downsampling 
threshold decreases the number of blocks of an excerpt that 
are queried. As evident, a query for an excerpt will not result 
in a false positive if at least one of its blocks gets a true 
negative. Therefore, decreasing the number of excerpt blocks 
for which the PAS queries will increase the false positive 
probability of the excerpt, i.e., a very high downsampling 
threshold increases the false positive rate. Hence, the false 
positive rate of the PAS has a minimum as a function of the 
threshold. We find the approximate optimum threshold by 
running several experiments in the evaluation section. 
B. Reducing false flows 
As stated before, since a PAS exhaustively queries for flows 
in the flow determination step, its false positive rate is high. 
Reducing the number of flows to be queried can be achieved 
by extracting features from the result of the appearance check 
query and attributing them to flows before querying for all of 
them. This means that the data structure of the Bloom filter 
should be modified so that some features be returned in case 
of a positive answer. We use a multi-section Bloom filter for 
this purpose. In the following, we introduce the multi-section 
Bloom filter, and then we describe our approach to reducing 
flow queries in the flow determination step. 
C. Multi-section Bloom Filter 
A multi-section Bloom filter (MSBF) with j sections and a 
bit array of size m bits, is composed of j smaller Bloom filters 
and k+1 hash functions. For an insertion operation, one hash 
function is used to select a sub-Bloom filter, and the insertion 
procedure is done in the selected sub-Bloom filter with k other 
hash functions. It can be easily proven that the false positive 
probability of an MSBF with a size of m bits and with k+1 
hash functions is equal to the false positive probability of a 
conventional Bloom filter of the same size with k hash 
functions  [23].  
The feature that can be returned by an MSBF in case of a 
positive answer is the section number in which the queried 
element has been found. Although this feature could be 
extracted directly by one of the hash functions in a 
conventional Bloom filter, the MSBF is introduced here due to 
its additional useful properties. Multi-section Bloom filters 
have been used by [23] and [24] to implement large high-
performance Bloom filters which do not fit into the main 
memory. Since payload attribution systems need large Bloom 
filters with a high insertion rate, the MSBF will be an 
appropriate replacement for the conventional Bloom filter. 
Therefore, in the proposed solution, we replace conventional 
Bloom filters with multi-section Bloom filters. However, a 
compact data structure is needed for storing the features. It 
should be noted again that the digesting process of a PAS must 
have a low-time complexity, and the data structure should also 
follow this rule like Bloom filters. We use a bitmap index 
table for this purpose. 
D. Bitmap Index Table 
A bitmap index table, which is usually used in database 
applications, is a data structure that improves the speed of data 
retrieval operations. In a bitmap index table, a row is 
considered for each entry, and each row has a bit array 
Fig. 6.  Distribution of true negative answers as a function of block size. 
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(commonly called bitmap) to store features. A bitmap index 
table is usually queried for some features, and it answers 
queries by performing bitwise logical operations on the 
bitmaps and returns the entries that are consistent with those 
features. Although an index table can increase the speed of a 
PAS in answering queries, the speed is not our challenging 
problem. Our aim is to reduce the false positive rate by 
reducing the flow queries in the flow determination step. 
We use a bitmap index table alongside the flow list of each 
interval. We consider a row having j bits with default values 
of ‘0’ in the index table for each flow appearing in the time 
interval. The value of j (number of columns of the index table) 
is equal to the number of sub-Bloom filters of the MSBF. The 
digesting process of each traffic flow in the proposed method 
is as follows: 
1. Add the flow into the flow list, and a row in the index 
table for the flow. 
2. Partition payloads of the flow, and extract type-I and 
type-II blocks. 
3. Insert all type-I blocks into the multi-section Bloom filter. 
4. In the index table, set the corresponding bit of the sub-
Bloom filter into which each type-I block is inserted. 
5. Insert all type-II blocks into the multi-section Bloom 
filter. 
For example, if the payload of Flow 1 is composed of 4 
blocks and the type-I blocks are inserted into sub-Bloom 
filters 2, 3, 6 and 10, the bits 2, 3, 6 and 10 of the row 
corresponding to Flow 1 are respectively set to ‘1’ in the index 
table, as depicted in Fig. 7; consequently, at the investigation 
time, we will know there are no type-I blocks related to Flow 
1 in the other sub-Bloom filters. In Fig. 7, we know, for 
example, sub-Bloom filter 6 has type-I blocks from Flow 1, 
Flow 2 and Flow 4. Therefore, if at least one of the type-I 
blocks of an excerpt is found in the sub-Bloom filter 6, the 
system should not query for Flow 3 and Flow 5. This feature 
can be used to shrink the flow lists before querying flows in 
the flow determination step and hence, reduce the flow 
queries. Thus, the investigation process for an excerpt is as 
follows: 
1. Query for the appearance check using type-I blocks, and 
determine the multi-section Bloom filters (time intervals) 
into which the excerpt has appeared. 
2. For each determined MSBF, determine the sub-Bloom 
filters into which all the type-I blocks have been inserted. 
3. Using the bitmap index table, reject all the flows that have 
at least a zero bit in the columns corresponding to the 
determined sub-Bloom filters. 
4. Query for flow determination using the remained flows.  
For example, in Fig. 7, if the appearance of an excerpt 
composed of 3 blocks is confirmed in the appearance check 
step, and the type-I blocks are found in sections 3, 6 and 10 of 
the multi-section Bloom filter, only Flow 1 and Flow 4, both 
having a value of ‘1’ in columns 3, 6 and 10, are queried in the 
flow determination step. In other words, the system generates 
type-II blocks and queries for them using only Flow 1 and 
Flow 4. Therefore, the flow queries are reduced. 
This approach can improve the performance of payload 
attribution systems if two conditions are met: the first is that 
the size of the table should be much smaller than the size of 
the Bloom filter. Obviously, we could increase the size of 
Bloom filters instead of adding a large data structure. The 
second condition is that the percentage of bits having a value 
of ‘1’ in the table should be low. This is important for two 
reasons: first, it increases the probability of removing false 
flows; second, it reduces the entropy of the index table. 
If the entropy of the index table is low, the table can be 
highly compressed using methods based on statistical 
redundancy elimination. This is important for us because we 
store the index table in a compressed form. It should be noted 
that a natural strategy to further minimize the storage of the 
archive contents is to compress the digest before storing it in 
the permanent storage system. This strategy has been used by 
some previous works ([3], [9]). At the investigation time, the 
Bloom filters are decompressed and queried one by one. 
However, Bloom filters are not capable of being considerably 
compressed due to their randomized nature (i.e., high 
entropy). Ponec et al. [9] achieved about 20 percent storage 
saving by compressing the Bloom filters using GZip. We 
show that the index table, unlike Bloom filters, has a low 
entropy and can be highly compressed. 
If the percentage of bits having a value of ‘1’ in the index 
table is low, the index table will contain long strings of zero 
bits and consequently, low entropy. This factor depends on the 
number of sub-Bloom filters and the average volume of traffic 
per flow. The greater amount of data a flow transfers, the more 
blocks of payloads it will have, and the higher will be the 
number of bits equal to ‘1’ for the flow in the index table. On 
the other hand, flows that carry a low volume of traffic will 
have a fewer number of bits having a value of ‘1’. 
Accordingly, shorter flows improve the performance of the 
index table for eliminating false positives and enhance its 
ability to be highly compressed. 
Based on the characteristics of traffic flows, a small 
percentage of flows carry the majority of Internet traffic [25]–
[31]. The measurements done in previous works show that 
most of the Internet flows carry individually a low amount of 
traffic. As a result of this behavior, known as ‘mice and 
 
Fig. 7.  An example of the bitmap index table. In this example, 
blocks of flow 1 are inserted into sections 2, 3, 6 and 10 of the 
multi-section Bloom filter. 
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elephants’ flows, the proposed method is expected to achieve 
good performance in terms of compression ratio and 
elimination of false positives. 
Before evaluating CBID, we examined the mentioned 
feature of the traffic in our experiments. Fig. 8 shows the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of flows as a function 
of flow data size. According to our results, more than 60 
percent of traffic flows have carried lower than 2000 bytes. 
Assuming that each flow within this 60 percent carries on 
average 1000 bytes, and considering the fact that the average 
size of blocks is 32 bytes, each flow will have 1000/32=31 
blocks, and consequently, 31 bits of the corresponding row in 
the index table will be set to ‘1’. Assuming an MSBF with 
2048 sections, only (31/2048)×100=1.5 percent of the index 
table in its 60 percent portion will be set, and therefore the 
entropy of the table will be very low. The entropy will be even 
lower by using the downsampling technique. In the next 
section, we present a detailed analysis and evaluation of 
CBID. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
In this section, we evaluate our method and compare it with 
the previous works. In addition to our method, we 
implemented the state of the art techniques WBS, WMH [9], 
CMBF [12] and WDWQ [13] using their most optimized 
reported parameters2. We digested the traffic discussed in 
Section III using the methods with a data reduction ratio of 
100:1, making the digest size 1 GB. In order to evaluate the 
false positive rate, we extracted 1000 excerpts, each 200 bytes 
long, while all of them had appeared only once in the traffic. 
We queried each PAS for determining the carrier flow of each 
excerpt. The ideal outcome is to report only one flow for each 
excerpt, i.e., its actual carrier flow. However, there are also 
false flows due to the Bloom filter false positive probability. 
We define the false positive rate of a PAS as ‘the number of 
falsely determined flows divided by the total number of 
distinct traffic flows.’ Table I represents the false positive 
rates. On average, the false positive rates are greater than 10% 
which means more than 10% of the traffic flows are falsely 
 
2 WBS: winnowing window size = 64 bytes, overlap length = 4 bytes. 
WMH: two instances of WBS. CMBF: hash window size = 8 bytes, 
aggregation factor = 3, fingerprint modulo = 8. WDWQ: hash window size = 
10, fingerprint modulo = 8. 
determined as the carriers of each excerpt. Since the excerpts 
have appeared only once in the traffic, and each one 
corresponds to a single flow, the observed false positive rate is 
very high. Hence, the large number of false flows makes next 
steps of the investigation and criminal detection impossible. 
It is important to note that if we do not insert the type-II 
blocks into Bloom filters and evaluate the false positive rate of 
each examined PAS in the appearance check step, we observe 
a false positive rate very similar to the reported results of the 
previous works. That is why we believe they have not taken 
into account the type-II blocks in their evaluation. In the 
following, we evaluate the downsampling approach and the 
bitmap index table scheme, and compare them with the 
previous works. It should be noted that the set of queried 
excerpts in all experiments are the same. 
A. Evaluation of downsampling 
We digested the traffic by our downsampling method using 
different downsampling thresholds. The winnowing window 
and the overlap length were 64 and 4 bytes, respectively. Then 
we queried for the excerpts. The false positive rates are shown 
in Table I. As explained in the previous section, there is an 
optimum value for the downsampling threshold due to the 
tradeoff between the Bloom filter false positive rate and the 
number of excerpt blocks for which the PAS queries. The 
proposed approach reduces the false positive rate for 
downsampling thresholds lower than 40 bytes. For the 
threshold of 50 bytes, the false positive rate significantly 
increases since a low portion of excerpt blocks is larger than 
the downsampling threshold. The 60-byte downsampling 
threshold results in an excessively high false positive rate. The 
reason is that some excerpts do not have any blocks larger 
than 60 bytes, and consequently, they always get a false 
positive response for each queried flow in the flow 
determination step. The 40-byte threshold is a proper choice 
for the optimum threshold which also has a sufficient safety 
margin from the destructive threshold. 
 
Fig. 8.  CDF of traffic flows as a function of flow payload size. 
TABLE I: FALSE POSITIVE RATES FOR PREVIOUS METHODS AND THE 
DOWNSAMPLING APPROACH 
Method False positive rate 
WBS 0.144 
WMH 0.140 
CMBF 0.141 
WDWQ 0.138 
Downsampling 
method 
Threshold = 10 0.130 
Threshold = 20 0.080 
Threshold = 30 0.076 
Threshold = 40 0.074 
Threshold = 45 0.075 
Threshold = 50 0.391 
Threshold = 60 0.966 
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B. Evaluation of Bitmap index table 
We modified the system described in the previous 
subsection to use the MSBF architecture instead of the 
conventional Bloom filter. The system creates the bitmap 
index table for flows at digesting time and utilizes it in the 
investigation procedure. Before evaluating the impact of the 
bitmap index table on the false positive rate, we evaluated the 
percentage of bits having a value of ’1’, the entropy and the 
maximum theoretical amount of compression of the index 
table as follows: first, we digested the traffic with a data 
reduction ratio of 100:1, and an index table was created for the 
flows. The downsampling feature was disabled in this 
experiment. Then, we examined the percentage of bits having 
a value of ’1’, the entropy and the maximum theoretical 
amount of compression for the index table. In this experiment, 
the entropies were calculated based on different symbol sizes. 
Moreover, the size of the codeword list was considered in the 
computation of the size of the compressed index table. The 
results of this experiment, which was run for different 
segmentations of the MSBF, are shown in Table II. In addition 
to the maximum theoretical compression ratio derived from 
entropy, the sizes of index tables compressed using the 
LZMA2 algorithm are also reported in Table II. Moreover, the 
overall data reduction ratio of the system (𝐷𝑅ை), which is 
determined by Equation 2, is also reported in this table.  
𝐷𝑅ை =
ୖୟ୵ ୲୰ୟ୤୤୧ୡ ୱ୧୸ୣ
୆୪୭୭୫ ୤୧୪୲ୣ୰ ୱ୧୸ୣ ା ஼௢௠௣௥௘௦௦௘ௗ ௜௡ௗ௘௫ ௧௔௕௟௘ ୱ୧୸ୣ
  
= ଵ଴଴ (ீ஻)
ଵ (ீ஻) ା େ௢௠௣௥௘௦௦௘ௗ ௜௡ௗ௘௫ ௧௔௕௟௘௦ (ீ஻)
     (2) 
As seen, both the percentage of bits having a value of ‘1’ 
and the entropy are small. For example, in the case of using an 
MSBF composed of 2048 sub-Bloom filters, more than 90% 
of the index table bits are equal to zero. This means that the 
flow queries are reduced at least by 90%. It should be noted 
that the number of bits which are checked in the index table 
per flow is equal to the number of excerpt blocks, and a zero 
bit for a block is enough to reject the flow; hence, the false 
positive rate will be reduced by more than 90% in this case. 
The size of the compressed index table is 65 MB, and 
therefore, the overall data reduction ratio of the system 
decreases by approximately 6%. Obviously, the entropy and 
the compressed index table size will be even smaller by 
enabling the downsampling feature. This is observed in the 
following experiment. 
C. Evaluation of CBID 
To evaluate the false positive rate, we digested the traffic 
using different segmentations of MSBF and different 
downsampling thresholds and then queried for the excerpts. 
The data reduction ratio was 100:1 when considering only the 
Bloom filter size as the digest size. Fig. 9 shows the achieved 
false positive rates. As can be seen, in all configurations of our 
PAS, the false positive rate significantly decreases in 
comparison with the results of the previous works shown in 
Table I; however, the size of the compressed index tables must 
also be considered prior to the final conclusion. 
TABLE II: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF BITMAP INDEX TABLE 
MSBF sections 1024 2048 4096 8192 
Size of index table (MB) 108 216 432 864 
Bits having a value of ‘1’ (%) 13.1 9.5 6.0 4.1 
Symbol size (Bytes) 8 32 128 256 8 32 64 128 8 16 32 64 8 16 32 64 
Entropy (bits) 15.3 24.0 27.9 27.5 13.1 23.0 26.8 26.9 10.8 19.0 22.7 24.0 9.0 11.9 12.7 13.3 
Best theoretical compression ratio 3.0 3.5 4.0 3.9 4.9 6.1 6.3 6.2 6.0 6.5 7.0 6.8 7.2 7.7 8.1 7.8 
Minimum theoretical size of 
compressed index table (MB) 30.0 27.7 26.3 27.0 44.1 35.4 34.3 34.8 72 66.5 61.7 63.5 120 112 107 111 
Size of compressed index table 
using LZMA2 (MB) 44 65 98 154 
Overall data reduction ratio (𝐷𝑅଴) 96 : 1 94 : 1 91 : 1 87 : 1 
 
TABLE III: OVERALL DATA REDUCTION RATIO (𝐷𝑅ை) OF CBID 
  Downsampling threshold 
  0 10 20 30 40 
MSBF 
sections 
1024 96:1 96:1 96:1 96:1 97:1 
2048 94:1 94:1 94:1 95:1 95:1 
4096 91:1 91:1 92:1 92:1 93:1 
8192 87:1 87:1 88:1 88:1 89:1 
 Fig. 9.  CBID false positive rate for different configurations 
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We determined the overall data reduction ratio (𝐷𝑅ை) of 
each configuration as shown in Table III. Then, we repeated 
the false positive rate evaluation of previous works with the 
data reduction ratios shown in this table. Table IV represents 
the false positive rates of all the methods as a function of data 
reduction ratio. As can be seen in Table IV, CBID 
outperforms the previous methods for all data reduction ratios. 
The false positive rate of CBID is on average 22 times less 
than the previous methods for the case of a data reduction ratio 
of 97:1. For the data reduction ratio of 89:1, the false positive 
rate of CBID is lower than 0.002 and may be sufficient for 
practical investigations. For this data reduction ratio, the false 
positive rate of CBID is on average 41 times less than the 
previous methods. 
Table V represents the computation time of digesting and 
querying for each method in our system. We have used one 
core of a Core i7 CPU with 8 GB of DDR3 RAM and an HDD 
storage. The reported digesting time is the computation time 
of digesting the 100 GB traffic using the configurations for the 
data reduction ratio of 97:1. The querying time is the 
computation time of querying for one excerpt. No 
considerable computation time overhead was seen. A detailed 
discussion on the computation cost is presented in the next 
section. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. Computation cost 
In the following, we discuss the impacts of performance-
related parameters on the computation overhead. As can be 
seen in the following, the computation overhead of a PAS is 
inversely related to its performance, and no optimum value 
can be found for it.  
Table VI represents the computation cost of the methods in 
detail. The boundary selection cost of CBID is equal to WBS 
and WDWQ. All of them use winnowing and therefore 
process a b-byte string twice. WMH uses t instances of WBS, 
and therefore its boundary selection cost is t times more than 
WBS. CMBF, which uses a fixed-block size scheme, has the 
least boundary selection cost. 
If the winnowing window size of WBS is set as twice the 
block size of CMBF, the number of blocks which must be 
processed will be approximately the same. In Table VI, the 
number of blocks of WBS is denoted as n. As a result of the 
downsampling approach, CBID has the least number of blocks 
which is equal to n/d. The value of d depends on the 
downsampling threshold. In our experiment, the 
downsampling threshold of 40 bytes yields d=2.2. 
The block processing cost for all previous methods is 
composed of computation cost of k hash functions, and 
consequently, k memory accesses to insert a block into a 
Bloom filter. CBID uses k+1 hash functions for MSBF and 
also an additional memory access for the bitmap index table. 
However, it should be noted that CBID decreases the flow 
queries in the flow determination step. 
Finally, the significant overhead of CBID is the 
compression cost of bitmap index tables. Bloom filters are 
stored in a permanent storage system without any additional 
overhead; nevertheless, bitmap index tables must be 
compressed before being stored. Since the entropy of a bitmap 
index table is very low, its compression process does not 
require high memory footprint and CPU time. It is worth 
mentioning that in the investigation time, it is not needed to 
decompress all the stored bitmap index tables. According to 
the results of the appearance check step, only the bitmap index 
tables of the time intervals comprising the excerpt will be 
decompressed. 
B. Attacks on PAS 
In the following, we discuss some significant ways an 
TABLE IV: FALSE POSITIVE RATE OF THE PAYLOAD ATTRIBUTION SYSTEMS AS A FUNCTION OF DATA REDUCTION RATIO 
  Data reduction ratio 
  97 : 1 96 : 1 95 : 1 94 : 1 93 : 1 92 : 1 91 : 1 89 : 1 88 : 1 87 : 1 
Method 
WBS 0.138 0.135 0.131 0.126 0.120 0.113 0.105 0.088 0.078 0.067 
WMH 0.134 0.130 0.125 0.120 0.115 0.108 0.100 0.081 0.069 0.059 
CMBF 0.135 0.131 0.125 0.120 0.116 0.109 0.102 0.082 0.069 0.060 
WDWQ 0.132 0.128 0.124 0.119 0.112 0.105 0.097 0.077 0.066 0.054 
CBID 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.003 
 
TABLE V: COMPUTATION TIME (MINUTES) 
 Digesting Querying 
WBS 135 0.15 
WMH 147 0.15 
CMBF 84 0.14 
WDWQ 136 0.15 
CBID 141 0.20 
 
TABLE VI: COMPUTATION COST OF THE METHODS 
 WBS WMH CMBF WDWQ CBID 
Boundary selection cost 2b 2tb b 2b 2b 
Number of blocks n tn n 2n n/d 
Block processing cost k k k k k+2 
Storage processing cost 0 0 0 0 >0 
b: length of data. t: number of WBS instances employed in WMH. 
n: number of blocks which must be processed by WBS. 
d: block reduction factor of CBID. k: number of hash functions. 
1556-6013 (c) 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2017.2769018, IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
 
 
10
adversary can evade the PAS. A more comprehensive 
discussion about possible attacks on payload attribution 
systems and solutions for mitigating their effects have been 
presented in [8], [9]. 
- Encryption: Just like any other PAS, an excerpt which has 
been encrypted and transferred through the network, can 
only be queried by having its encrypted form. A possible 
solution to overcome this problem is to use payload 
attribution systems in a distributed manner. In this scheme, 
encryption algorithms are provided with the digest 
extraction ability. Each network node, which has access to 
plain data of its own encrypted traffic, sends digests to the 
network’s central forensics server. Since digests are not 
reversible to the plain data, privacy is preserved. 
Moreover, the network traffic workload does not 
considerably increase due to the low volume of digests. 
Kulesh et al. [8] have presented such a distributed 
framework for a PAS, and discussed its deployment 
challenges. 
- Small blocks: The downsampling approach makes CBID 
vulnerable to payloads composed only of blocks smaller 
than the downsampling threshold. Moreover, a large 
number of small blocks can reduce the performance of 
bitmap index table. However, since the boundaries are 
selected using winnowing on a hashed payload, it is highly 
improbable to have payloads comprised of a large number 
of small blocks. 
- Fragmentation: An adversary can divide a malicious data 
stream among very small packets by using a low TCP 
segment size. Therefore, the PAS may not be able to 
generate any block boundaries for the packets. A solution 
is to make the PAS stateful [8], [9] in which it reassembles 
payloads of one data stream prior to processing at the cost 
of additional memory and computation. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper presented a brief survey of previous works on 
payload attribution systems as a tool for storing digests of 
network traffic to be used in network forensics applications. 
We proposed a solution based on the combination of Bloom 
filters and compressed bitmap index tables to reduce the false 
positive rate of payload attribution systems. Moreover, our 
scheme has been enriched by a downsampling technique. An 
analytical approach based on the characteristics of network 
traffic statistics and information theory showed that the 
proposed method could significantly decrease the false 
positive rate without negatively impacting the data reduction 
ratio. The proposed method was compared with the 
approaches of previous works using the same data reduction 
ratio. The results show that the false positive rate decreases at 
least one order of magnitude. Future studies will seek to add 
the ability to answer wildcard queries with at least the same 
achieved false positive rate. 
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